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Fuquea and Friedman: 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for th

an easy read, the arguments it makes
are of vital interest to naval strategists,
innovators, and those interested in
the complex relationships and processes that are now part and parcel
of the national defense paradigm.
JOHN T. KUEHN

Friedman, B. A., ed. 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern
Era. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014.
150pp. $21

21st Century Ellis is a solid contribution to the Naval Institute’s 21st Century
Foundations series and the scholarship
regarding the touted U.S. Marine Corps
visionary Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete”
Ellis. The strength of this volume lies
in the compilation of most of Ellis’s
scholarly works. B. A. Friedman has
assembled five articles written by Ellis
in the decade between 1911 and 1921
(a total of about 110 pages) into four
chapters. Ellis’s text is supplemented by
Friedman’s introduction and additional
commentary highlighting the value of
Ellis to both his contemporaries and
current executors of the operational art.
Friedman arranges the essays by subject
rather than chronologically. This allows
the reading of the book by section without any loss of flow or context. Chapter
2, the shortest, reviews Ellis’s First World
War experience in France on the staff of
John A. Lejeune. Chapter 3 is substantially longer but unlike the preceding
chapter is perhaps of more applicability
to modern practitioners. Two lectures
prepared by Ellis during his tenure as a
faculty member at the U.S. Naval War
College examined the challenges of
fighting a naval campaign in the western
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Pacific. Composed in 1911–12, these
proved prescient in their assessment of
the tension building between Pacific
naval powers and the war they would
fight after Ellis’s death. There is great
legitimacy to the editor’s claim that “Ellis predicted war with Japan in 1912.”
Chapter 1 may be most relevant to
Marines of this century. Ellis draws
from his substantial experience fighting
counterinsurgency in the Philippines
during the early years of last century. His
seventeen-page article “Bush Brigades”
provides a solid foundation for any
twenty-first-century warrior preparing
for service in Iraq or Afghanistan. The
editor summarizes how Ellis’s tenets
are strongly reflected in the Marine
Corps’s Small Wars Manual as well as
today’s counterinsurgency doctrine,
while lamenting the “ill use of many of
these tenets” in more-modern conflicts.
A current practitioner would benefit
by paying attention to Ellis’s words.
The final chapter built around Ellis’s
work, chapter 4, is the longest and the
major impetus behind Friedman’s effort.
Ellis is frequently viewed by Marines
as the man who laid the template for
modern amphibious operations. Read
in detail, Ellis’s article “Advanced Base
Operations in Micronesia” reinforces
that view. Ellis systematically takes a
reader through the requirements for an
advance across the Pacific to be successful. Many of these tenets informed
Marine Corps development prior to
the U.S. entry into the Second World
War, laying the groundwork for highly
successful amphibious operations in
both the Pacific and European theaters.
While successful in providing a new
generation of military practitioners easy
access to Ellis’s work, 21st Century Ellis
could have more successfully achieved
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the book series’s stated purpose of asking
“the right questions.” With the operational factors of time, space, and force
still vital to success, few questions with
which the Marine Corps must struggle
in the twenty-first century relative to
Ellis were asked. The editor’s acceptance
of “Air-Sea Battle” as a valid concept
relative to Ellis falls short. The editor’s
comments fail to question shortfalls of
the current Navy–Marine Corps team
to sustain the logistics necessary for any
large-scale amphibious operations in the
maritime environment of the Pacific—
a setting whose scope and scale have
not changed since Ellis’s day. Questions
should be asked about whether current
equipment procurement can fulfill the
tenets Ellis was prescient in defining
should they become required again in
this century. This solid work of scholarship, produced by a junior Marine Corps
officer, missed a chance to challenge
current Marine Corps efforts by failing
to ask tough questions the way that
Ellis did a century ago. So, for practitioners of war, read this book, but keep
a paper and pen handy to scribe your
own tough questions for the future.
DAVID C. FUQUEA

Friedman, Norman. Fighting the Great War at
Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 416pp. $85

This title is the most recent “tour de
force” from this prolific and authoritative naval historian. It is a massive
undertaking in almost every way, from
its imposing 12ʺ × 10ʺ coffee-table
format to its 360-plus pages (over 400
with notes) filled with dense, small print
and lavishly illustrated with contemporary photographs. People familiar with
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Friedman’s other works will understand
that it is no exaggeration to say that the
detail that he provides in these captions alone could form the framework
for any number of smaller, themed
books were they to be collected and
organized differently. So, coffee-table
format it may be, but this is a serious
work, covering all aspects of the maritime war in an encyclopedic fashion.
The endnotes alone run to forty-plus
pages and, while we may lament the
imprecise citations in some areas, the
notes are filled with further ideas to
stimulate still more work in the future.
In many ways this is a book that only Dr.
Friedman could have attempted; most
others would have shied away from the
immensity of the task and back into
the comfort of a focused analysis on a
smaller, more easily bounded theme.
Friedman, however, has an almost
unique ability to sweep across the disciplines, picking out the main points and
delving into both the historical and technological detail where necessary. A case
in point is his exposé of the loss of the
three British battle cruisers at Jutland, a
tragedy that he lays squarely at the feet
of the poor magazine practices prevalent in certain quarters of the Grand
Fleet at the time and not, in spite of the
official sanction, the result of any undue
design flaws in the ships themselves.
Such an approach is not an easy one,
and some may feel that the book sits
rather uncomfortably between the true
historical monograph or narrative and
a specialist reference work as a result.
Technically speaking, it is neither. The
text is not chronological and is too dense
and concentrated to be read easily from
cover to cover, while the inconsistent citations, although far better than in other
works, will likely still aggravate the serious scholar. Enticing and unattributed
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